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TEXT OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

The fourth amendment to the federal constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
Article I, Section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.

iv

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES

1.

Are the search warrant and supporting affidavit

invalid under the fourth amendment to the federal constitution?

a.

Is the affidavit facially deficient in that

it failed to state sufficient facts for a determination of
probable cause?

b.

Did the material misstatements and omissions

invalidate the search warrant?

2.

Are the search warrant and supporting affidavit

invalid under the Utah Constitution?

3.

Does the search warrant violate statutory and

constitutional requirements for particularity?
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
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Salt Lake City, Utah (Addendum A).

The search warrant authorized a

search for "[c]ocaine, a white powdery substance, cutting agents,
packaging and scales." JEJ3. at 1,
In the second paragraph of the affidavit in support of:
the search warrant, Deputy Michael Droubay, the affiant, stated that
within the past ten days, between February 24 and March 5, 1987, he
used a confidential informant ("CI.") to make two "controlled" buys
at 533 South Montgomery (Addendum B at 2). At the hearing on the
motion to suppress, Deputy Droubay acknowledged that this statement
was false since the C I . had never been inside the premises at 533
Montgomery as far as Deputy Droubay knew (Transcript of Evidentiary
Hearing held September 17, 1987, hereinafter "T" at 19, 20).
The affidavit later stated that on two separate
occasions, the affiant and assisting detectives searched the C I . ,
then gave him money and instructions to purchase certain amounts of
cocaine.

The C I . then entered the Atherton apartment (Addendum 3,

2-3) .
According to the affidavit, shortly after the C I .
entered the Atherton apartment, officers observed a man "known as
Randy" leave the apartment and drive to the Montgomery address.
at 2.

The affidavit pointed out:
Your affiant received information, at that time,
from the C I . as he entered the apartment, he was
greeted by the suspect, known to us as RANDY. He
handed the currency to RANDY, and RANDY then left
the apartment for parts unknown to purchase the
cocaine.

Id. at 3 (emphasis added).
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Your attiant and assisting Detectives, h a v i ^
had C I . purchase cocaine on at least eight
separate occasions, and each representation made

was born out by producing either cocaine or
marijuana. The C.I. has also purchased marijuana
and cocaine on several occasions for your affiant
and assisting Detectives.

The affiant stated he verified the information from the
C.I. in the following manner:
Your affiant has used information given to him
by the C.I. to make arrests of your narcotic
dealers, said to obtain other search warrants.
The previous search warrants obtained by your
affiant and o-ther Narcotic Detectives using
information, and controlled buys from the C.I.
have all been confirmed by producing controlled
substance, as a result of the authorized searches,
including narcotics packaging, and resulting in
arrests of persons for violation on those premises.
Id.
Deputy Droubay stated that he considered the C.I.
reliable because he and assisting detectives had the C.I. purchase
cocaine on prior occasions.

However, Detective Droubay failed to

include information in the affidavit that the C.I. was not an
officer and had previously been arrested for Distribution of a
Controlled Substance (T. 35). The judge was also not informed that
officers were dropping four additional counts of Distribution of a
Controlled Substance against the C.I. in exchange for his undercover
work (T. 40).
Mr. Droubay also failed to inform the judge that during
half an hour to an hour, "the suspect known as Randy" was in transit
or at the Montgomery residence on each of the two occasions, no
officers were watching the Atherton apartment which the C.I. had
entered to make the "controlled" buys and that the C.I. was
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Defense counsel moved to suppress the evidence seized on
March 10f 1987, pursuant to the search warrant (R. 17). An
evidentiary hearing was held on September 17, 1987 (R. 24).
Thereafter, counsel submitted memoranda (R. 49-78) and the matter
was orally argued on January 27, 1988 (R. 79). The trial judge
denied the motion to suppress (R. 79).
On February 8, 1988, the matter was submitted to the
judge for decision based on the evidence introduced in the motion to
suppress hearing plus additional stipulated facts (Trial Transcript
hereinafter "TT" at 6). Defense counsel renewed her motion to
suppress at trial and the trial judge again denied such motion
(TT. 6) •
The Court found Mr. Pyeatt guilty of Unlawful Possession
of a Controlled Substance with Intent to Distribute, a second degree
felony; Unlawful Possession of a Controlled Substance, to wit:
Marijuana, a Class B misdemeanor; and Unlawful Possession of
Paraphernalia, a Class B misdemeanor (TT. 12).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The search warrant and supporting affidavit were invalid
under the fourth amendment to the United States Constitution.
First, the affidavit on its face failed to state sufficient facts to
establish the existence of probable cause to search the house at 533
Montgomery Avenue.

Second, even if the affidavit were facially

sufficient, the affiant intentionally or recklessly included
material misrepresentations and omitted material information.
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ARGUMENT

POINT I . . .' .
THE SEARCH WARRANT AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT ARE
INVALID UNDER THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION,
-«- *—
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hereinafter "TH" at 6-13).
(TH 27-8).

The Court denied the motion to suppress

(For entire transcript of judge's ruling, see

Addendum C.)
A review of the affidavit in support of the search
warrant and testimony of the officers establishes that the decision
of the trial court to deny the motion to suppress was erroneous.
See State v. Gallegos, 712 P.2d 207, 208-9 (Utah 1985).

Hence,

despite the "great deference [given] to a magistrate's determination
of probable cause," the trial court's denial of the motion to
suppress should be reversed on appeal.

State v. Romero, 660 P.2d

715, 719 (Utah 1983); see also Gallegos, 712 P.2d at 208-9.
("[T]his Court will not disturb the ruling of the trial court on
questions of admissibility of evidence unless it appears that the
lower court was in error.").
A. THE AFFIDAVIT WAS FACIALLY DEFICIENT IN THAT
IT FAILED TO STATE SUFFICIENT FACTS FOR A
DETERMINATION OF PROBABLE CAUSE.
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution,
applicable to state criminal cases through the fourteenth amendment,
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
In Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 103 S.Ct. 2317, 76
L.Ed.2d 527 (1983), reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1237 (1983), the United
States Supreme Court abandoned the two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli

- 8 -

test1 followed previously when evaluating an affidavit which relied
on an informant's tip, and embraced the broader "totality of the
circumstances" test.
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply to
make a practical, common sense decision whether,
given all circumstances set forth in the affidavit
before him, including the 'veracity1 and 'basis of
knowledge' of persons supplying hearsay
information, there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in
a particular place.
462 U.S. at 238-9 (quotations omitted).
The Utah Supreme Court has followed the United States
Supreme Court in applying the more general "totality of the
circumstances" test (see State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258 (Utah
1983); State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099 (Utah 1985)), requiring that
there be a fair probability that the evidence exists and can be
found where the informant says it is located.

See State v.

Anderson; State v. Bailey, 675 P.2d 1203 (Utah 1984).
In the instant case, the affidavit failed to establish
that cocaine was ever inside the premises at 533 Montgomery Avenue.
While the facts set forth in the affidavit may have raised a
suspicion that the cocaine obtained by the C.I. came Prom the
Montgomery house, they did not amount to probable cause so as to
allow a constitutionally permissible search.

1 The test evolved from the cases of Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108, 84 S.Ct. 1509, 12 L.Ed.2d 723 (1964) and Spinelli v.
United States, 393 U.S. 410, 89 S.Ct. 584, 21 L.Ed.2d 637 (1969).
The two prongs were (1) the affidavit was required to establish the
basis of the informant's knowledge and (2) the affidavit must
establish the informant's veracity or reliability.

- 9 -

In many cases where the Utah Supreme Court has upheld a
search warrant, an officer or confidential informant has actually
seen the contraband inside the house.

In State v. Anderton, the

confidential informant observed marijuana inside the premises and
relayed that information to the affiant, and in State v. Bailey, the
confidential informant saw the stolen goods inside the premises and
heard the defendant say he had burglarized an automotive shop.
By contrast, in the instant case, the affidavit contains
no assertion that anyone saw cocaine inside the premises at
Montgomery Avenue.

While the affidavit did contain a paragraph

which stated:
C.I. stated that at the time affiant was aware
that RANDY was at the Montgomery address, C.I.
received, at the Atherton address, a phone call
from RANDY saying the "stuff" is on the scale and
that RANDY would be back.
that statement does not say that cocaine was being kept in the
Montgomery house.

Furthermore, the statement depends not only on

the veracity and reliability of the C.I., but also on the
reliability of "RANDY," who was an unknown in the operation and the
primary suspect (T. 9-10).

Because of the lack of verification and

the general nature of the statement, the alleged statement by
"Randy" fails to establish a fair probability that cocaine was in
the Montgomery house at the time of the first buy.
In addition, the affidavit failed to establish the
reliability of the C.I. or any other participant.

Although the

formal two-pronged Aguilar-Spinelli test is no longer followed,
compliance with that test is still a relevant consideration under
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the broader totality of the circumstances test.

Anderson, 701 P.2d

at 1101.
In this case, the affidavit stated:
Your affiant and assisting Detectives, have had
the C.I. purchase cocaine on at least eight
separate occasions, and each representation made
was born out by producing either cocaine or
marijuana. The C.I. has also purchased marijuana
and cocaine on several occasions for your affiant
and assisting Detectives.
It is unclear from this paragraph whether the officer was directly
involved in the purchases or was informed of them by other
officers.

Nor is it clear the type or number of representations

made by the C.I. which resulted in the purchase of drugs.

The only

piece of usable information in this paragraph is that on eight
separate occasions, the C.I. was able to produce illicit drugs.
The affidavit also stated:
Your affiant has used information given to him
by the C.I. to make arrests of your narcotic
dealers, said to obtain other search warrants.
The previous search warrants obtained by your
affiant and other Narcotic Detectives using
information, and controlled buys from the C.I.
have all been confirmed by producing controlled
substances, as a result of the authorized
searches, including narcotics packaging, and
resulting in arrests of persons for violation on
those premises.
The number of search warrants obtained based on the C.I.'s
information and whether Droubay or another officer obtained them is
not clear.

While the searches incident to such search warrants

produced drugs and packaging and led to the arrest of persons on the
premises, the affidavit does not clarify whether specific
information given by the C.I. led to those arrests or whether the
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arrests resulted in convictions.

As worded, the affidavit leaves

some question as to the basis of the officer's belief that the C.I.
was reliable.
Furthermore, other than the "coincidence in timing" of
the two visits to the Montgomery house by a person who had been
present in the Atherton house, nothing in the affidavit indicated
that cocaine sold to the C.I. came from the Pyeatt house, and not
from the car or the Atherton house or some other source.
In State v. McManus, 243 N.W.2d 575 (Iowa 1976), the Iowa
Supreme Court suppressed evidence seized pursuant to a search
warrant where the affidavit stated that a third person met with an
officer to sell him marijuana, then drove to a farmhouse and
returned with the substance.

The Court pointed out:

Our problem with the facts of this case is that
there was nothing beyond the mere coincidence of
timing of the visit of Goodrich to the McManus
farmhouse to connect defendant with any
wrongdoing. There was no indication from the
affidavit for the search warrant or the abstract
of the oral testimony that Goodrich's auto did not
already contain the marijuana before his visit to
the farmhouse, that Goodrich took anything from
the farmhouse to his car while there or that he
even opened the trunk of the vehicle at any time
he was at the farm. There was no indication of
any independent information linking defendant to
wrongdoing, of which the events of November 1
might have been corroborative. There was no
indication that Goodrich or anyone else provided
information tending to incriminate defendant.
Defendant himself was apparently not observed on
November 1; the information for the search warrant
indicated the affiant did not know who occupied
the house near Lone Tree. There was no indication
of any other suspicious visits to defendant's home.
Id. at 578.
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In State v. Witwer, 642 P.2d 828 (Alaska App. 1982), the
Court upheld a search warrant where the affidavit was prepared after
following a person engaged in the sale of cocaine to the premises on
two separate occasions.

The officers prepared the affidavit in

anticipation that the seller would return to the premises a third
time prior to consummating another sale and with the stipulation
that the search warrant would be executed only if the seller went to
the premises during a third transaction.

The Witwer court

emphasized the importance of that third transaction for reaching a
conclusion that the detour to the premises must be related to the
transaction and not merely coincidental.
In the present case, the affidavit did not contain
information that the officers saw "Randy" carrying anything as he
left the Montgomery house on either of the two occasions.

Nor did

the affidavit contain information that Mr. Pyeatt sold the cocaine
to anyone or that incriminated Mr. Pyeatt in any way.

Officers did

not even know who lived in the premises at 533 Montgomery when they
requested the search warrant.
Under the totality of the circumstances of this case, the
affidavit failed to present sufficient facts that there was a "fair
probability" that cocaine had been inside the premises at the
Montgomery address at the time that the C.I. made the two
"controlled" buys.
Nor did the affidavit present sufficient facts to
establish that even if cocaine had been sold at the Montgomery
address, cocaine would be found there at the time the warrant was
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executed.

The affidavit asserted that "[w]ithin the past ten days,

between the period of February 24th and March 5th, 1987," the
affiant had executed two controlled buys using the C.I.

The search

warrant was not signed by the magistrate until March 10, 1987, at
least five days after the last controlled buy and as much as sixteen
days after the first buy.
In State v. Kittredge, 585 P.2d 423 (Or. Ct. App. 1978),
the Court held an affidavit stating that a C.I. was inside certain
premises within the past ninety-six hours and had seen marijuana
while inside was not sufficient for a finding of probable cause.
The Court determined that the "peculiar facts set out in the
affidavit were 'stale'" (^Id. at 424) and that the affidavit lacked
sufficient showing that the marijuana would still be present.

The

Court pointed out that several facts were not made known in the
affidavit including (1) the quantity of marijuana seen inside the
premises, (2) in whose possession the marijuana was seen or (3) the
prior history of the suspects which might suggest marijuana would
still be on the premises. jM. at 424-5.
Similarly in State v. McGee, 607 P.2d 217 (Or. Ct. App.
1980), the Court invalidated a search warrant where the affidavit
stated that a C.I. had seen marijuana in the defendant's house
during the past forty-eight hours.

The Court referred to Kittredge,

stating:
We observed that the affidavit did not relate how
much marijuana was seen in the house, v/ho normally
occupied the house, who actually possessed the
marijuana, or whether the suspect had a history of
drug use or dealings.
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_Id. at 218.
In the present case, the two buys could have occurred as
long as sixteen days prior to the execution of the search warrant.
Nothing contained in the affidavit established or suggested that had
cocaine been at the Montgomery premises, it would still be there.
The minimal number of contacts over a relatively short time span did
not suggest an ongoing drug enterprise.

Nor was there an assertion

anywhere in the affidavit that the cocaine actually came from the
Montgomery address or that anyone saw cocaine inside the premises.
Obviously, since no one stated he or she saw cocaine inside the
premises, the amount or who actually possessed the cocaine was not
discussed.

Finally, since officers had not bothered to ascertain

who lived at the premises prior to obtaining the search warrant,
they had no information regarding prior drug use or dealings by the
occupants.
Given the remoteness of the incidents discussed in the
affidavit and the lack of information regarding items seen

in the

house or the occupants of the house, the affidavit failed to
establish that, even if there had been cocaine in the house at one
time, it would still be there when the search warrant was executed.
The "good faith" exception to the probable cause
requirement under the fourth amendment which was created in United
States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 S.Ct. 3405, 82 L.Ed.2d 677 (1984),
reh'g denied, 468 U.S. 1250, 105 S.Ct. 52, 82 L.Ed.2d 942 (1984),
and its companion case, Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981,
1045 Ct. 3424, 82 L.Ed.2d 737 (1984), does not permit the admission
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of evidence seized from the Pyeatt home pursuant to the invalid
warrant.

The United States Supreme Court created the "good faith"

exception to allow the admission of evidence seized pursuant to a
search warrant which later proved to be defective where the
"officers acted in the objectively reasonable belief that their
conduct did not violate the Fourth Amendment."
918.

Leon, 468 U.S. at

While in some circumstances it is objectively reasonable to

believe that a search warrant is valid (see e.g. Massachusetts v.
Sheppard, 468 U.S. at 989), the high court made it clear "that in
some circurastances the officer will have no reasonable grounds for
believing that the warrant was properly issued."

_Id. at 922. The

Court pointed out:
Suppression therefore remains an appropriate
remedy if the magistrate or judge in issuing a
warrant was misled by information in an affidavit
that the affiant knew was false or would have
known was false except for his reckless disregard
of the truth. Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,
57 L.Ed.2d 667, 98 S.Ct. 2674 (1978).

Nor would an officer manifest objective good faith
in relying on a warrant based on an affidavit "so
lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render
official belief in its existence entirely
unreasonable." (Citations omitted.) Finally,
depending on the circumstances of the particular
case, a warrant may be so facially deficient—i.e.
in failing to particularize the place to be
searched or the things to be seized—that the
executing officers cannot presume it to be valid.
,Td. at 923.
In the present case, as set forth in subpoint B below,
Droubay, the affiant officer, knew that certain information
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contained in the affidavit was false and misled the issuing
magistrate by the use of such information and by the omission of
other material information.

Under such circumstances, the good

faith exception is inapplicable.
Furthermore, as set forth above, the affidavit on its
face was so insufficient that an officer could not reasonably
believe that probable cause to search the Montgomery house existed.
The failure to particularize the items to be seized, instead giving
a general description of cocaine and paraphernalia one might guess
would be found, further suggests that an officer could not
reasonably believe that the search warrant was valid.
Because the affidavit failed to establish a fair
probability that cocaine had been inside the house at 533 Montgomery
Avenue or that if it had been, it was still there, no probable cause
existed for a search of the Montgomery house.

The evidence obtained

pursuant to the invalid warrant is not admissible under the Leon
good faith exception, and the fruits of the unlawful search should
therefore be suppressed.
B. MATERIAL REPRESENTATIONS AND OMISSIONS IN THE
AFFIDAVIT INVALIDATED THE SEARCH WARRANT.
In Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-6, 98 S.Ct.
2674, 57 L.Ed.2d 667 (1978), the United States Supreme Court held
that a defendant has the right to an evidentiary hearing where he or
she makes a preliminary showing that a false statement was
intentionally included in the affidavit or done so with a reckless
disregard for the truth and such false statement was necessary for a
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finding of probable cause.

The court further determined that if the

defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence at the
hearing that the false statement was intentionally included by the
affiant, or included with a reckless disregard for the truth, then
the false material must be excised from the affidavit and the
remaining information contained in the affidavit must be reviewed
for a determination as to whether it supports a finding of probable
cause.

If probable cause does not exist without the excised

material, the search warrant must be voided and the items seized
under the warrant excluded.
In Franks, the affiant officer included statements in the
affidavit attributed to two persons at the Youth Center where the
defendant had been employed.

Defense counsel requested the

opportunity to call the affiant officer to testify as well as the
two individuals at the Youth Center and proffered that the two
individuals would testify that they had not made the statements to
the affiant.

Defense counsel further contended that the affiants

included the misstatements in the affidavit in bad faith.

Franks v.

Delaware, 438 U.S. at 158. Under such circumstances, the Court held
that a hearing to determine the veracity of the information was
appropriate.
In State v. Slowe, 728 P.2d 110 (Utah 1985), reh'g denied
(1986), the Utah Supreme Court, citing Franks v. Delaware,
acknowledged that "[fjalse statements in a probable cause affidavit
made knowingly, intentionally, or recklessly, can invalidate a
warrant issued in reliance thereon [citation omitted]."
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Id. at

111.

In Slowe, the police officer prepared the affidavit prior to a

transaction which was part of a "sting" operation.

The transaction

occurred essentially as anticipated, and the statements in the
affidavit were, for the most part, accurate.

Although the Court did

not condone the preparation of affidavits prior to the occurrence of
events described therein, it found no error and determined that
"[t]he minor discrepancies that did occur did not undermine the
essential truth of the allegations or rise to the level of
knowingly, intentionally or recklessly making a false statement."
Id. at 111.
In State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 138 (Utah 1986), cert,
denied, 107 S.Ct. 1565, decided shortly after Slowe, the Utah
Supreme Court followed the fourth amendment analysis in Franks v.
Delaware and extended the Franks analysis to include omissions as
well as misrepresentations.

The court pointed out that the

affidavit must be examined to determine whether the affidavit would
support a finding of probable cause if material misrepresentations
were not included or if material omissions were added.

In Nielsen,

the officer swore in the affidavit that a confidential informant
told him that a person living at Nielsen's address and driving a
distinctive car had a large amount of cocaine in his possession.
The officer attested to the C.I.'s reliability based on prior
transactions with the C.I.

At the preliminary hearing, the officer

essentially reiterated the statements in the affidavit. J[d. at 190.
After the preliminary hearing, the state revealed that
the affiant did not know the C.I. and had not been informed of the
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details in the affidavit.

Instead, another police officer who

worked with the C.I. had given the information to the affiant
officer.

Id.
The Court found the state's contention that the false

statements were not made intentionally or with a reckless disregard
for truth "entirely unpersuasive," pointing out:
A law enforcement officer must be aware not only
of the need for accuracy in the information
provided to a magistrate in support of an
application for a search warrant, but also of the
importance of absolute truthfulness in any
statements made under oath.
Id. at 191 (emphasis added).
Despite the intentional false statements made by the
officer in the affidavit, the Nielsen court upheld the search
warrant "under federal law" (Ij3. at 192) because the falsehood "was
not material to the magistrate's finding of probable cause." j[d. at
191.

In reaching its decision, the Court relied on the "presumption

that police officers will be truthful in their communications with
each other, [and the rule that] double hearsay may support the
issuance of a warrant. . .". J^d. at 192.
In State v. Miller, 740 P.2d 1363 (Utah App. 1987), this
Court followed the fourth amendment rule set forth in Franks v.
Delaware and State v. Nielsen and determined that the alleged
misstatements were not included intentionally or with a reckless
disregard for the truth since they "were based upon reasonably
reliable information such as official public documents" (Ici. at
1366-7) and the defendant did not present evidence that the affiant
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included the falsehood intentionally or with a reckless disregard
for the truth.

Ld. at 1367.

The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that omissions of
material information from an affidavit as well as material
misrepresentations in the affidavit must be considered when
determining whether the search warrant is valid.

Where information

is omitted from an affidavit, "the affidavit must be evaluated to
determine if it will support a finding of probable cause when the
omitted information is inserted (citations omitted)."

State v.

Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191.
In People v. Kurland, 618 P.2d 213 (Cal. 1980), cert,
denied, 451 U.S. 987 (1981), the California Supreme Court discussed
the impact of the omission of facts from an affidavit and concluded
that "the affiant's duty of disclosure extends only to 'material' or
'relevant' adverse facts (footnote omitted)."

jjd. at 218. The

Court concluded that omitted facts are material "if their omission
would make the affidavit substantially misleading."

_Id. The Court

went on to say that facts are material if "there is a substantial
possibility they would have altered a reasonable magistrate's
probable cause determination."

Id.

The Colorado Supreme Court pointed out in People v.
Winden, 689 P.2d 578 (Colo. 1984) that:
Omissions that are the product of an intentional
effort to mislead the issuing magistrate or a
reckless disregard of known material facts would
normally justify more severe sanctions than errors
occurring for other reasons.
Id. at 583. The rationale for more severe sanctions such as the
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quashing of the warrant where information is intentionally omitted
is that :
When the police edit their information and
withhold from the magistrate potentially adverse
facts which they view as irrelevant or cumulative,
then the police interfere with the magistrate's
constitutional function. Although in such cases
warrant applications may contain facts rather than
conclusions, such affidavits are nonetheless
conclusory in their selectivity. As a result,
there is an increased risk that the privacy of the
citizenry will be invaded on the basis of the
police's as opposed to the court's assessment of
relevance and reasonableness.
People v. Kurland, 618 P.2d at 226 (Bird, J., dissenting).
In the instant case, material misrepresentations were
included in the affidavit and material information which might have
altered the judge's probable cause determination was omitted from
the affidavit.

The most glaring misrepresentation occurred in the

second paragraph of the facts listed in the affidavit.2

m

that

paragraph, Deputy Droubay stated that within the past ten days,
between February 24 and March 5, 1987,3 he had used a confidential
informant to execute two controlled buys of cocaine at 533
Montgomery Ave. (Addendum B at 2). At the hearing, Deputy Droubay
acknowledged that this statement was false since the C.I. had never
been inside the Montgomery address (T. 19,20).

2

The first paragraph outlined Deputy Droubay's
background and experience.
3 The search warrant was signed on March 10, 1987, so
this statement regarding timing of the buys was also inaccurate.
Had the buys been made in the ten days prior to signing of the
search warrant, they would have been made between March 1 and
March 10, 1987. Judge McCleve apparently made no effort to clarify
this discrepancy.
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The misrepresentation in the instant case is more
egregious than that which was included in the affidavit in State v,
Nielsen.

In Nielsen, the information from the C.I. was essentially

correct; the misrepresentation involved which officer had received
the information and could attest to the reliability of the C.I., but
not the essence of the information upon which probable cause was
found.

In the case before the Court, the misrepresentation went to

the heart of the probable cause finding and was included
intentionally or, at the very least, with a reckless disregard for
the truth.
As the Nielsen court emphasized, a law enforcement
officer is aware of the need for accuracy and truthfulness in
preparing an affidavit and such awareness should be taken into
account when determining whether the officer had the requisite
intent when he included the falsehood.
A police officer is also aware of the haste with which an
affidavit is often reviewed.

In Franks v. Delaware, the United

States Supreme Court acknowledged that:
The pre-search proceeding will frequently be
marked by haste, because of the understandable
desire to act before the evidence disappears; this
urgency will not always permit the magistrate to
make an extended independent examination of the
affiant or other witnesses.
Id. at 680.4

4

In the Third Circuit Court in Salt Lake County, the
judge generally signs search warrants during a brief recess in
arraignments.
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The location of the false information in the affidavit
supports a determination that the affiant intentionally included the
falsehoods.

The first paragraph of the facts in the affidavit

outline Deputy Droubay's background and experience.

Therefore, the

second paragraph containing the misrepresentation that two
controlled buys occurred at the address to be searched was the first
information concerning the basis for the search warrant to reach the
magistrate.
The organization and substance of the remainder of the
affidavit does little to dispel the incorrect impression initially
given the magistrate and thus adds support to a finding that the
Deputy intentionally misrepresented the facts to the magistrate.
The third paragraph discusses preparing the C.I. to make a
controlled buy and offers no information that this occurred at the
Atherton address and not the place to be searched.

The fourth,

fifth and sixth paragraphs state that the C.T. entered the Atherton
apartment and that someone then left the Atherton location and drove
to the Montgomery address, then returned.

A magistrate quickly

scanning the affidavit might not pick up that two addresses were
involved; even if she did, it is not clear that the person who left
the Atherton apartment is someone other than the C.I.

It is not

until the second paragraph on page three of the affidavit that it
becomes apparent the C.I. and Randy are different people.

Given the

complicated scenario, the lengthy fact statement, and the multiple
persons and addresses involved, the officer should have known that
the information in the first "substantive" paragraph would have an
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overwhelming impact on the magistrate.
The numerous other misrepresentations and omissions of
information from the affidavit show that Droubay was intentionally
attempting to mislead the magistrate.

As outlined in Point IA at

14/ Droubay's statement regarding the timing of the two buys was
inaccurate, and the incidents may have occurred as much as sixteen
days prior to issuance of the search warrant.
In addition, Droubay stated that the C.I. told him that
"as he entered the apartment, he was greeted by the suspect, known
to us as RANDY.

He handed the currency to RANDY, and RANDY then

left the apartment for parts unknown to purchase the cocaine.
(Addendum 3 at 3).
Despite somewhat confusing testimony as to who Randy was
and whether he or someone else drove from the Atherton address to
the Montgomery address, Droubay acknowledged that the person who
officers followed from the Atherton address was not Randy:
A: His first name was Brad. . . . He was
identified by first name to us by the C.I. at the
time of the first controlled buy. We knew who was
going to be doing the driving; we knew who we had
to follow.
T. 16.
The misinformation regarding whether Randy or Brad or
someone else drove to the Montgomery address is significant when
considered in conjunction with Droubay's assertion to Judge McCleve
in the affidavit that the C.I. gave the money to Randy for a
purchase and Randy then drove to the Montgomery address.

If the

C.I. actually gave the money to Randy and another person then drove
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to the Montgomery house, the connection between the C.I., the
"controlled buy" and the Montgomery address is much more attenuated
than if the C.T. gave the money to someone who then drove to the
Montgomery house.
In asking for a no-knock warrant that could be served at
any time, Deputy Droubay also stated that:
Independent surveillance also supports the fact
that there is heavier traffic at night, and that
the persons residing in the residence are usually
away during the day.
Addendum B at 4.

Deputy Droubay watched the Montgomery house on

only three occasions.

He kept no notes but testified that one of

those occasions was during the day and two were in the evening
(T. 66-67).

During those visits, he saw three people enter and

leave the house.

Although he stated in the affidavit that the

people who reside at the Montgomery house were "usually av/ay during
the day" (Addendum 3 at 4 ) , he testified that he did not know who
resided in the house and that during his single daytime visit, he
saw children present (T. 59-60).

The presence of children during

the day suggests, contrary to the sworn statement of Deputy Droubay,
that the occupants were present during the day.

Furthermore, a

single daytime surveillance is not sufficient to support the
conclusion that the occupants were "usually" gone.
Finally, in asking that the search warrant be issued,
Droubay reiterated that "your affiant has purchased cocaine, via the
C.I. on two different occasions."

Addendum B at 4.

Although the

Montgomery address is not stated, the implication is that the buys
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occurred at that address.

The sentence is located at a place within

the affidavit where a magistrate quickly scanning the material would
be apt to focus.

The repetition of the incorrect information

contained in the second paragraph further suggests Droubay had the
requisite intent in including the false information.
Droubay also failed to include several pieces of material
information in the affidavit.

He did not inform the magistrate that

during the half hour to hour that he and other detectives followed
the person from the Atherton address, the C.I. was left unattended.
Droubayfs attempt to cover this lapse when testifying (T. 38-9),
when read in conjunction with the testimony of the other officers
that no officers remained at the Atherton address, further
establishes that Droubay acted in bad faith and intentionally or
with a reckless disregard for the truth in presenting false
information to the magistrate.
Droubay also did not inform the magistrate that persons
other than "Randy" resided at the Atherton address or that other
people were in the Atherton apartment when the C.I. entered
(T. 11-12, 13, 41). Nor did Deputy Droubay inform the magistrate
that the C.I., who was left alone for a long period of time, was not
an officer, that he had been arrested for Distribution of Controlled
Substance, and that officers were dropping four additional counts of
Distribution of Controlled Substance against the C.I. for his
undercover work (T. 40).
The nature of the false information, its location in the
affidavit, the organization of the affidavit, and the numerous
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additional misstatements and omissions coupled with the glaring
falseness of the statement and attempts to mislead the trial court
judge with false testimony establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that Droubay intentionally included the falsehoods or did
so with a reckless disregard for the truth.

These were not innocent

mistakes but a deliberate attempt to mislead the magistrate.

Based

on the officer's testimony and a review of the affidavit, it is
clear that the trial judge's finding that Deputy Droubay did not act
in bad faith was erroneous.
Pursuant to the analysis set forth in State v. Nielsen
and Franks v. Delaware/ once the defendant establishes that an
officer intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth,
included a falsehood in the affidavit, under the fourth amendment,
the falsehood must be excised and the remainder of the affidavit
analyzed for a determination as to whether probable cause to support
a search warrant existed.

In addition, material omissions must be

inserted when determining whether a search warrant should be upheld.
In determining whether probable cause existed for the
issuance of a search warrant under the fourth amendment, the
statements regarding controlled buys being made at the Montgomery
address must be excised.5

5

Because of the location of this paragraph, and the
pervasiveness of this type of information, the taint of the
misinformation is difficult to excise. A magistrate who read the
second paragraph and reviewed the information that two controlled
buys had occurred at the premises to be searched would have
difficulty ferreting out the true facts from the complicated
scenario outlined in the affidavit.
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The information regarding the C.T. giving the money to
Randy and Randy leaving must also be excised since the officer knew
at the time he wrote the affidavit that this was incorrect.
Similarly, the information regarding a phone call from Randy while
at the Montgomery address must be excised because the officer knew
at the time he drafted the affidavit that Randy was not at the
Montgomery address.
In addition, information that the C.I. was left
unattended for the half hour to hour during which the officers drove
to and waited at the Montgomery residence must be inserted along
with information that the C.I. had been arrested in the past for
Distribution of Controlled Substance and the officers were dropping
additional charges involving illegal drugs based on the C.I. working
with them.6
An examination of the affidavit without the false
information and including the omitted information reveals that
probable cause for the warrant did not exist.

As outlined in

subpoint A, no one saw cocaine inside the Montgomery house and the
cocaine the C.I. gave officers could have come from the car, the
Atherton house, or other people inside the Atherton house.

The

information that the C.I. was left unattended for a significant
period of time raises numerous other potential sources—the C.I.
could have left the Atherton address to obtain cocaine or others,

6

Some judges believe that an intentional material
omission requires that the search warrant be quashed. See People v.
Kurland, 618 P.2d at 226 (Bird, J., dissenting); People v. Winden,
689 P.2d 578 (Colo. 1984) .
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undetected by the absent officers, could have entered the apartment
with cocaine.
The added information that the C.I. had allegedly
participated in the sale of illegal drugs and stood to benefit by
the dismissal of four counts of Distribution of Controlled
Substances by helping officers impacts on the issue of the C.I.'s
reliability.

As previously outlined, the general statements in the

affidavit regarding the C.I.'s credibility left some question as to
whether information from the C.I. had ever resulted in a
conviction.

Although the affidavit does not assert that the C.I.

said the cocaine came from Randy, the C.I.'s reliability is
nevertheless of paramount importance in light of the significant
amount of time he was left unattended during which he could have
obtained cocaine from numerous sources.
In addition, the information regarding the phone call
from "Randy" must be excised since the officer knew that Randy was
not the person who left the house.

Finally, had the magistrate

known that officers had conducted surveillance of the Montgomery
residence on only one occasion during the day and that the
occupants, which included children, may well have been home at that
time and the "heavier traffic" at night consisted of only three
people, there is a substantial possibility her decision to issue the
search warrant might have been different.
As outlined in Point IA, the affidavit was very weak on
its face.

Once the falsehoods are excised and material omissions

inserted, it becomes apparent that the trial court erred in
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upholding the search warrant, since probable cause to search the
Montgomery residence did not exist.

The evidence seized pursuant to

the invalid search warrant should have been suppressed.

POINT II
THE SEARCH WARRANT AND SUPPORTING AFFIDAVIT ARE
INVALID UNDER THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
Article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated; and no warrant shall issue but upon
probable cause supported by oath or affirmation,
particularly describing the place to be searched,
and the person or thing to be seized.
It is well established that Utah is free to analyze its
state constitution differently from case law which is based on an
interpretation of the federal constitution.

See State v. Earl, 716

P.2d 803 (Utah 1986); State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5
(Utah 1988); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264, 271-72 (Utah 1985)
(Zimmerman, J., concurring).
This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have acknowledged
that federal law under the fourth amendment has become "a labyrinth
of rules built upon a series of contradictory and confusing
rationalizations and distinctions" (Hygh, 711 P.2d at 271-2) and
that in certain contexts, a distinct analysis under article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution may be preferable to a fourth
amendment analysis.

.1(3., see also State v. Larocco, 742 P.2d 89, 95

n.7 (Utah App. 1987) (pet, cert, granted); I<1. at 103-5 (Billings,
J., concurring and dissenting).
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In State v. Watts, 750 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1988), although
the majority? asserted that the court had not interpreted article I,
section 14 differently from the fourth amendment, it acknowledged
that "choosing to give the Utah Constitution a somewhat different
construction may prove to be an appropriate method for insulating
this State's citizens from the vagaries of inconsistent
interpretations given to the fourth amendment by the federal
courts.

(Citations omitted. ) n

ld9

at 1221, n.8.

In his dissent in Watts,8 Justice Zimmerman disagreed
with the majority's statement that the Court has "'never drawn any
distinctions' between article I, section 14 and the federal fourth
amendment and has 'always considered the protections afforded to be
one and the same.'"

id,, at 1125.

He pointed out:

Several of our older cases may have language
that supports this view, although none have
pondered the question deeply, and some members of
this Court may still agree with it, but I do not
think this dictum expresses the views of all those
joining in the Chief Justice's opinion, much less
a majority of the Court. My view on this point
finds support in footnote 8 of the majority
opinion, which differs dramatically in tone from
the text referred to above.
Id. at 1226.
In State v. Nielsen, 727 P.2d 188 (Utah 1986), the Court
concluded that the falsehood contained in the affidavit was not

7 The majority was comprised of Justices Hall and Howe
and Judge Orme of this Court participating in the place of Justice
Stewart.
8 justice Durham concurred in Justice Zimmerman's dissent.
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material and upheld the search warrant under the Franks fourth
amendment analysis.

The Court pointed out, however, that the

decision was not dispositive of how the issue might be resolved
under article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

The Court

acknowledged that "the federal law as it has developed since
Franks v. Delaware is not entirely adequate" and that "[t]here is no
stronger argument for developing adequate remedies for violation of
the state and federal constitutional prohibitions on unreasonable
searches and seizures than the example of a police officer
deliberately lying under oath in order to obtain a search warrant."
Id. at 192-3.

Hence, an analysis under the Utah Constitution

distinct from that in Franks v. Delaware is appropriate where
misrepresentations are included in an affidavit in support of a
search warrant or omitted therefrom.9
Prior to the decision of the United States Supreme Court
in Franks v. Delaware, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals pointed
out that "[i]f the affiant intentionally makes false statements to
mislead a judicial officer on application for a warrant, these
falsehoods render the warrant invalid regardless of whether or not
such statements are material to establishing probable cause."

9 in Franks, the defendant "conceded that if what is left
is sufficient to sustain probable cause, the inaccuracies are
irrelevant" and that if "the warrant affiant had no reason to
believe the information was false, there was no violation of the
Fourth Amendment." Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. at 172. Hence, the
issue of whether an intentional or reckless misrepresentation in an
affidavit invalidates the search warrant was not presented to the
high court.
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United States v. Hunt, 496 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1974); see also United
States v, Thomas, 489 F.2d 664 (5th Cir. 1974).
The Alaska Supreme Court has deviated from the decision in
Franks in interpreting its constitutional proscription against
unreasonable search and seizure.

See Moreau v. State, 588 P.2d 275

(Alaska 1978); State v. Malkin, 722 P.2d 943 (Alaska 1986).

In

State v. Malkin, the Court noted:
If, in fact, the police officer affiant
intentionally made the misstatements then the
search warrant should be invalidated whether or not
probable cause would remain from the affidavit
after the misstatements were excised. A deliberate
attempt to mislead a judicial officer in a sworn
affidavit deserves the most severe deterrent
sanction that the exclusionary rule can provide.
Further, the fact that the officer has lied puts
the credibility of the officer and of the entire
affidavit into doubt. (Citations omitted.)
Id., at 946 n.6.
The Louisiana Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion
that a warrant cannot "survive the intentional deception of a
magistrate by an affiant" in State v. Caldwell, 384 So.2d 431 (La.
1980) .
In People v. Cook, 583 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1978), the
California Supreme Court also determined that where deliberate
falsehoods are contained in an affidavit, the entire affidavit and
search warrant must be quashed.

The Court noted:

Contrary to the case of negligent mistakes,
excision of deliberate falsehoods in an affidavit
does not leave the remaining allegations unaffected
and hence presumptively true. The fact that the
misstatements are intentional injects a new element
into the analysis, to wit, the doctrine that a
witness knowingly false in one part of his
testimony is to be distrusted in the whole.
- 34 -

Id, at 140. The court summed up that "although the court can excise
the intentionally false allegations it cannot presume the remainder
to be true.

Lacking a reliable factual basis in the affidavit, the

court has no alternative under settled constitutional principles but
to quash the warrant and exclude the product of search.
omitted.]"

[Citations

j[d. at 141.
The Court pointed out that elimination of intentional

falsehoods is not enough since officers would have "everything to
gain and nothing to lose in strengthening an otherwise marginal
affidavit by letting their intense dedication to duty blur the
distinction between fact and fantasy.

[Citations omitted.]"

Id.

The reasoning of the Alaska, Louisiana and California
courts, among others, should be adopted when analyzing article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

Where an officer intentionally

includes false information in an affidavit or includes such
information with a reckless disregard for its truth, the entire
affidavit should be invalidated.

The fact that a significant

misrepresentation was included in an affidavit, despite the
officer's awareness of the necessity for accuracy (see State v.
Nielsen, 727 P.2d at 191), raises a question as to the reliability
and veracity of the information contained in the rest of the
affidavit.

Furthermore, officers who intentionally or recklessly

include falsehoods in an affidavit should realize that negative
repercussions will result from the use of such misrepresentations.
In the present case, where numerous misrepresentations,
stretching of the facts and omissions occurred, the entire affidavit
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becomes suspect.

The overwhelming taint of the falsehood contained

in the second paragraph permeates the entire affidavit.

Rather than

attempting to excise the many falsehoods and insert the omissions,
this Court should adopt the more straightforward approach that
article I, section 14 requires that an affidavit be invalidated
where an officer intentionally or with a reckless disregard for the
truth swears to a material misrepresentation.
As outlined in Point IB, the misrepresentations were
included intentionally or, at the very least, with a reckless
disregard for the truth and the omissions were left out with the
intent to mislead the magistrate.

Under article I, section 14, the

search warrant in this case should be invalidated as a result of the
intentional or reckless misrepresentations and omissions in the
affidavit.
California courts have also held that where a
misrepresentation is negligently included in an affidavit, the
misrepresentation must be excised and the affidavit reviewed for a
determination as to whether probable cause exists absent the false
statement.

See People v. Theodor, 501 P.2d 234 (Cal. 1972)

(modified on denial of reh y g); People v. Cook, supra.

Even if this

Court determines that Droubay was merely negligent in including the
false statements, it should nevertheless, under article I,
section 14 of the Utah Constitution, excise the false statements and
review the remainder of the affidavit.

Even if the statements were

included negligently, they were nevertheless false and not properly
included.
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The affidavit absent the false statements, as set forth in
Point IB above, does not set forth sufficient facts for a finding of
probable cause and the search warrant should therefore be quashed
and the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant suppressed.
This Court should follow the lead of other state courts
and interpret article I, section 14 of the Utah Constitution to
require that where an officer affiant intentionally or recklessly
includes material misstatements in and omits material information
from an affidavit, the entire affidavit must be invalidated.

In

addition, this Court should interpret the State Constitution to
require the excision of misstatements which are negligently included
in an affidavit.

Pursuant to either approach, the search warrant

was invalid under the Utah Constitution and evidence seized pursuant
to the invalid warrant should be suppressed.
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse
his conviction and remand the case for a new trial absent the
illegally seized evidence, or, in the alternative, dismissal.

POINT III
THS SEARCH WARRANT VIOLATES STATUTORY AND
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PARTICULARITY.
Both the fourth amendment of the federal constitution and
article 1, section 14 of the Utah Constitution require that a search
warrant describe with particularity the items to be seized.

Utah

Code Ann. §77-35-3(1) (1953 as amended) also requires that a search
warrant particularly describe the evidence or property to be seized.
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In Allen v, Holbrook, 135 P.2d 242, 249 (Utah 1943)
modified on reh'g. and pet, denied, 139 P.2d 233 (Utah 1943), the
Utah Supreme Court explained the particularity requirement:
The goods to be seized must be described with such
certainty as to identify them, and the description
must be so particular that the officer charged with
the execution of the warrant will be left with no
discretion respecting the property to be taken
(citations omitted).
Id. at 249.
In the instant case, both the search warrant and the
affidavit list the items to be seized as "Cocaine, a white powdery
substance, cutting agents, packaging and scales."

The types of

cutting agents, packaging and scales and the amount or consistency
of cocaine are not specified.

Such a general description of the

items to be seized violates the particularity requirement of both
constitutions as well as the statutory requirement, and the items
seized pursuant to the search warrant should therefore be suppressed.

CONCLUSION
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse
his conviction and remand this case for a new trial without the
illegally seized evidence or, in the alternative, dismissal.
Respectfully submitted this

/ (^
•

day of November, 1988.

/

•-.<-£/ UU?]&::BROOKE C. WELLS
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
vfOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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DAVID E. YOCOM
County Attorney
By: HOWARD R. LEMCKE
Deputy County Attorney
Courtside Office Building
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: (801) 363-7900

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SEARCH WARRANT
No
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
To any peace officer in the State of Utah.
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by
C. Mike Droubay - Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office, Narcotics
Division, I am satisfied that there is probable cause to believe
That

(X) on the premises known as 533 South Montgomery, 1575 West,
the east side of a red brick duplex, with white trim and
a red front porch with black rod iron railing.

In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there
is now certain property or evidence described as:
Cocaine,
scales.

a white

powdery

substance,

cutting

agents, packaging and

and that said property or evidence:
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means
of committing or concealing a public offense; or
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct;
Affiant believes the property and evidence described above is
evidence of the crime(s) of UNLAWFUL DI§W5Btntf$F OF A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE FOR VALUE and UNLAWFUL POSSESS I cf^u^fiait(Li^TROLLEC SUBSTANCE
WITH THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE IT FOR V A L U E ^ %
T^^^^fn^}^
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PAGE TWO
SEARCH WARRANT
You are therefore commanded:
(X) at any time day or night (good cause having been shown)
(X) to execute without notice of authority or purpose, (proof
under oath being shown that the object of this search may
be quickly destroyed or disposed of or that harm may
result to any person if notice were given)
to make a search of the above-named or described premises for the
herein-above described property or evidence and if you find the same
or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before me at the Fifth
Circuit Court, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, or retain such
property in your custody, subject to the order of this court.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this

V^

day of March, 1987.

" JUDGE'OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT

ADDENDUM B

DAVID E. YOCOM
County Attorney
By: HOWARD R. LEMCKE
Deputy County Attorney
Courtside Office Building
231 Ease 400 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: (801) 363-7900

IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake

)
): ss
)
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT

BEFORE:

SHEILA MCCLEVE

4 50 SOUTH 200 EAST

JUDGE

ADDRESS

The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he has reason to believe
That
(X) on the premises known as 533 South Montgomery, 1575 West,
the east side of a red brick duplex, with white trim and
a red front porch with black rod iron railing.
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there
is now certain property or evidence described as:
Cocaine,
scales.

a white

powdery

substance,

cutting

agents,

packaging

and

and that said property or evidence:
(X) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed; or
(X) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense; or
(X) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means
of committing or concealing a public offense; or
(X) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct;
Affiant
believes
the property
and evidence described
above is
evidence of the crime(s) of UNLAWFUL DISTRIBUTION OF A CONTROLLED
SUBSTANCE FOR VALUE and UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE
WITH THE INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE IT FOR VALUE.

PAGE TWO
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
The facts
are:

to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant

Your affiant is a Salt Lake County Deputy Sheriff with two
and a half years of law enforcement experience.
Your affiant is
presently assigned to the Narcotics Division. Your affiant has been
trained by P.O.S.T., Utah Police Academy, in the identification of
narcotics.
Your affiant has also received continued education and
training
regarding
narcotic
dealings
through experienced
police
officers and on the job experience.
Within
and March 5th,
cocaine, using
C.I. to obtain
Lake City, Salt

the past ten days, between the period of February 24th
1987, your affiant has executed two controlled buys of
a confidential informant.
Hereafter, referred to as
cocaine at 533 South Montgomery, the east duplex, Salt
Lake County, Utah.

On the first occasion, the C.I. met with your affiant, and
assisting Detectives, where the C.I. was searched.
The C.I. had no
money, nor controlled substances, on his person. The C.I. was given
$275.00, consisting of two $100.00 bills, three $20.00 bills, one
$10.00 bill, and one $5.00 bill, and given instructions to purchase
3.5 grams of cocaine, known as an "eight ball".
At that point, the C.I. left your affiantfs vehicle and
walked directly to 4545 Atherton, in the Lexia Haven Apartment
Complex, building #7, Apartment 144. He was observed by your affiant
to enter that apartment building. He did not make any stops, divert
his paths, or make contacts with anyone, up to that point.
Approximately two minutes later, a male white, approximately
5 9 , 150 pounds, blonde, curly hair, known as RANDY, was observed by
your affiant leaving the apartment, went to the parking lot, and got
into a 1982 Datsun, red in color, Utah listing:
MVT 214.
This
suspect was then followed by the Narcotics Squad to 533 South
Montgomery.
He made no stops, nor did he divert his path, prior to
arriving at the Montgomery address.
The suspect parked his car in
front of the Montgomery address, and was observed by myself and
Deputy Herlin, to enter the east door of the red brick duplex at that
time. The suspect stayed there for approximately twenty-two minutes,
and then was observed by Deputy Judd leaving the same door of the
residence, getting back into his vehicle, and then again proceeded
south bound on Interstate 15.
f

M

He was followed by myself and the Narcotics Squad, directly
back to 4545 Atherton, Apartment #144. He made no stops, nor did he
divert his path this time either.
The suspect arrived back at the
apartment in approximately fifteen minutes, walked directly from his
car back into the apartment, where approximately five minutes later,
the C.I. was observed to exit the apartment, and walk directly back
to your affiant's vehicle.

PAGE Three
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
The C.I. was re-searched at that time, finding no U.S.
Currency, or controlled substances on him, besides a small paper
bindle, inside a plastic bag, which contained a white powdery
substance. The package, containing the white powdery substance, was
field tested by your affiant.
A portion of which resulted in a
positive indication for cocaine.
C.I. stated that at the time affiant was aware that RANDY was
at the Montgomery address, C.I. received, at the Atherton address, a
phone call from RANDY saying the "stuff" is on a scale and that RANDY
would be back.
Your affiant received information, at that time, from the
C.I. as he entered the apartment, he was greeted by the suspect,
known to us as RANDY.
He handed the currency to RANDY, and RANDY
then left the apartment for parts unknown to purchase the cocaine.
On the second occasion, the C.I. met with your affiant and
assisting detectives, where the C.I. was searched again, finding no
U. S. currency or controlled substances on him.
At that point, he
was given $220.00 in U. S. currency, consisting of two $100.00 bills,
and one $20.00 bill. The C.I. was given instructions at that time to
purchase two grams of cocaine. The C.I. got back into his vehicle,
which had also been searched by your affiant, drove directly to 4545
Atherton, Apartment #144.
He did not divert his path, nor make
contact with anybody. He then left his vehicle and walk directly to
apartment #144, and was given entrance.
Approximately three minutes later, the same suspect, known as
RANDY, exited the apartment and walked directly to the 1979 Mercury
Monarc, with Utah listing:
161 AMW.
He got into the vehicle and
proceeded out of the apartment complex, east on 45th South, and north
on Interstate 15, followed by the entire Narcotics Squad.
The suspect remained northbound on Interstate IS to the
Redwood Road exit, took the Redwood Road exit to 5th South, went from
5th South, directly to 533 South Montgomery, where he was observed by
Deputy Rigby to walk directly to 533 Montgomery and enter.
This
being sixteen minutes, from the time he left the Atherton address.
The suspect stayed inside the residence for approximately
eight minutes, and then was observed by Deputy Rigby to exit the
residence, walk directly to his car, and proceeded to 5th South, then
to Redwood Road, then back to Interstate 15 southbound.
At this point, the suspect drove directly back to 4545
Atherton, #144, without diverting his path, or making contact with
anybody.
He was observed by Deputy Rigby to park the car in the
parking lot, and walk directly to #144 and enter.

PAGE FOUR
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
One minute later, your affiant observed the C.I. exit the
residence, walk directly to his vehicle, and drive to a pre-arranged
point, without diverting his path, or making contact with anyone. He
was re-searched approximately four minutes, as was his vehicle,
finding no controlled substances, other than a small paper bindle,
containing a white powdery substance, which he was instructed to
order from the suspect known as RANDY.
The package that contained the white powdery substance, a
portion of which was tested by your affiant.
It resulted in a
positive indication for cocaine.
Your affiant considers the information received from the confidential
informant reliable because (if any information is obtained from an
unnamed source)
Your affiant and
purchase cocaine on at
representation made was
marijuana.
The C.I. has
several occasions for your

assisting Detectives, have had the C.I.
least eight separate occasions, and each
born out by producing either cocaine or
also purchased marijuana and cocaine on
affiant and assisting Detectives.

Your affiant has verified the above information from the confidential
informant
to
be
correct
and
accurate
through
the
following
independent investigation:
Your affiant has used information given to him by the C.I. to
make arrests of your narcotic dealers, said to obtain other search
warrants. The previous search warrants obtained by your affiant and
other Narcotic Detectives using information, and controlled buys from
the C.I. have all been confirmed by producing controlled substances,
as
a
result
of
the
authorized
searches,
including
narcotics
packaging, and resulting in arrests of persons for violation on those
premises.
WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the
seizure of said items:
(X) at any time day or night because there is reason to
believe it is necessary to seize the property prior to it
being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered, or for
other good reasons, to-wit:
Your affiant has purchased cocaine, via the C.I. on two
different occasions. Independant surveillance also supports the fact
that there is heavier traffic at night, and that the persons residing
in the residence are usually away during the day.

PAGE FIVE
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
It is further requested that (if appropriate) the officer executing
the requested warrant not be required to give notice of the officer's
authority or purpose because:
(X) the property sought
of, or secreted.

may

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME this

be

quickly

destroyed,

disposed

/fQr/'day of March, 1987.

JUDSE IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT COURT,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH
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